One word at a time: adversarial attacks on retrieval models by Raval, Nisarg & Verma, Manisha
One word at a time: adversarial attacks on retrieval models
Nisarg Raval
Linkedin, New York
nraval@linkedin.com
Manisha Verma
VerizonMedia, Yahoo! Research, New York
manishav@verizonmedia.com
ABSTRACT
Adversarial examples, generated by applying small perturbations to
input features, are widely used to fool classifiers and measure their
robustness to noisy inputs. However, little work has been done
to evaluate the robustness of ranking models through adversarial
examples. In this work, we present a systematic approach of lever-
aging adversarial examples to measure the robustness of popular
ranking models. We explore a simple method to generate adversar-
ial examples that forces a ranker to incorrectly rank the documents.
Using this approach, we analyze the robustness of various ranking
models and the quality of perturbations generated by the adversar-
ial attacker across two datasets. Our findings suggest that with very
few token changes (1-3), the attacker can yield semantically similar
perturbed documents that can fool different rankers into changing
a document’s score, lowering its rank by several positions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning ranking models increasingly represent the state-of-
the art in ranking documents with respect to a user query. Different
neural architectures [3, 6, 13] are used to model interaction between
query and document text to compute relevance. These models rely
heavily on the tokens and their embeddings for non-linear trans-
formations for similarity computation. Thus, they capture semantic
similarity between query and document tokens circumventing the
exact-match limitation of previous models such as BM25 [9].
The complexity of deep learning models arises from their high
dimensional decision boundaries. The hyperplanes are known to
be very sensitive to changes in feature values. In computer vision
literature [15] and text based classification tasks [12], researchers
have shown that deep learning models can change their predictions
with slight variations in inputs. There is a large body of work that
investigates adversarial attacks [12] on deep networks to quantify
their robustness against noise. There is, however, lack of such ex-
periments and evaluation in information retrieval literature. Mitra
et.al. [7] demonstrated how word replacement in documents can
lead to difference in word representations which leaves room for
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Query Relevant Document Replaced by ↓Rank
what can be powered
by wind
Wind power is the conversion of wind energy into a useful
form of energy, such as using wind turbines to make elec-
trical power , windmills for mechanical power, wind pumps
for water pumping or drainage , or sails to propel ships.
wind 12
what causes heart
disease
The causes of cardiovascular disease are diverse but
atherosclerosis and/or hypertension are the most common.
disorder 8
how many books
are included in the
protestant Bible?
Christian Bibles range from the sixty-six books of the
Protestant canon to the eighty-one books of the Ethiopian
Orthodox Tewahedo Church canon.
christian 5
how many numbers
on a credit card
An ISO/IEC 7812 card number is typically 16 digits in
length, and consists of:
identification 4
how many amend-
ments in us
The Constitution has been amended seventeen additional
times (for a total of twenty-seven amendments).
allowing 4
what is a monarch to
a monarchy
A monarchy is a form of government in which sovereignty
is actually or nominally embodied in a single individual
(the monarch ).
throne 4
Table 1: Examples of our one word adversarial perturbation
and change in document position when ranked by DRMM.
more investigation of the robustness of deep ranking models to
adversarial attacks.
Usually, adversarial attackers perturb images to reverse amodel’s
decision. Noise addition to images is performed at pixel level such
that a human eye cannot distinguish true image from noisy image.
In text classification tasks, characters or words [5, 8] are modified
to change the classifier output. The objective of the adversary is to
reverse model’s decision with minimum amount of noise injection.
In information retrieval, however, it remains an open problem as to
how does one design an adversary for a ranking model. We posit
that the objective of an adversary in information retrieval would
be to change the position of a document with respect to the query.
We follow a similar approach used in text classification tasks [5, 8]
and perturb tokens in documents, replacing them with semantically
similar tokens such that the rank of the document changes.
In this work, we demonstrate by means of false negative adver-
sarial attacks that three state-of-the-art retrieval models can change
a document’s position with slight changes in its text. We evalu-
ate the robustness of these ranking models on publicly available
datasets by injecting varied length of noisy text in documents. We
propose a black-box adversarial attack model that takes a (query,
document) pair as input and generates a noisy document such that
its pushed lower in the ranked list. Our system does not need ac-
cess to the ranker’s internal architecture, only its output given the
(query, document) tuple as input.
Our findings suggest that ranking models can be sensitive to
even single token perturbations. Table 1 shows some examples gen-
erated by our model of one word perturbations along with changes
in document position when scored using state-of-the-art ranking
model. Overall, we found that simple attackers could perturb very
few words and still generate semantically similar text that can fool
a model into ranking a relevant document lower than non-relevant
documents.
2 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial attack on deep neural networks has been extensively
explored in vision [11] and text classification [8, 12]. Existing work
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has proposed adversarial attacks with either white-box or black-
box access to the model. In this work, our focus is on black-box
attacks since access to ranking models is not always available. Ex-
isting work is also limited in that the focus is on changing classifier
decisions and not document positions in ranked list with respect
to a query. In this work we explore utility of (query,doc) pair in
adversarial attacks on ranking models.
3 OUR APPROACH
Our goal is to minimally perturb a document such that the rank
of the document changes. In particular, we target top-ranked doc-
uments and attempt to lower their rank through noise injection.
Assuming relevant documents are ranked higher, the objective is to
lower the position of a document with minimal change in its text.
3.1 Problem Statement
Let q, d and F represent a query, a document and a ranking model,
respectively. Given a query-document pair (q, d), the ranker outputs
a score s = F (q, d) indicating the relevance of the document d to
the query q, where higher score means higher relevance. Given a
query and a list of documents, the ranker computes scores for every
document w.r.t the given query and rank documents based on a
descending order of the scores. Given q and d, our goal is to find
a perturbed document d′ such that F (q, d′) << F (q, d) so that it
ranks lower than its original rank. At the same time we want to
minimize the perturbation in the document.
We assume that both query and document are represented as vec-
tors which could be either sequence of terms or other suitable rep-
resentations such as word embedding. Let q = (q1,q2, ...,qp ) be a p-
dimensional query vector and d = (d1,d2, ...,dq ) be a q-dimensional
document vector. We construct a perturbed document d′ = (d + n)
by adding a q-dimensional noise vector n = (n1,n2, ...,nq ). Our goal
is to find a noise vector that reduces a document’s score without
changing many terms in the document. We formulate this problem
as an optimization problem as follows:
minimize
n
F (q, d + n)
subject to | |n| |0 ≤ c
(1)
Here, c is a sparsity parameter that controls the number of per-
turbed terms. Although, the above formulation provides a sparse
solution, we do not have any control over themagnitude of the noise
vector. In other words, even though we change only few terms in a
document we may end up changing them significantly. To address
this problem, we modify the objective function as follows:
minimize
n
F (q, d + n) +
q∑
i=1
D(di , (di + ni ))
subject to | |n| |0 ≤ c
(2)
Here,D can be any suitable distance function (e.g., cosine distance)
that computes distance between two terms. It ensures that the modi-
fied terms are close to the original terms. We found this formulation
too strict. In particular, it penalizes perturbations of query terms
as well non-query terms in a document. Hence, we modify the
objective function to penalize only query terms since we want to
ensure that the perturbed document stays relevant to the query.
The modified objective function is as follows:
minimize
n
F (q, d + n) +
q∑
i=1
1di ∈q[D(di , (di + ni ))]
subject to | |n| |0 ≤ c
(3)
Here, 1x is an indicator function with is 1 when x is true and 0
otherwise. The first term in the objective function ensures that the
ranker gives low score to the perturbed document while the second
term incurs penalty of changing query terms in the document. The
constrains limits the number of changed terms in a document to c .
3.2 Method
A popular approach to solve the above problem relies on computing
gradient of the model’s output (score) with respect to the input and
use this gradient to find a noise vector that reduces model’s score
on noisy input [2]. Such gradient based methods do not work well
with textual data due to non-differentiable components such as an
embedding layer. A common workaround is to find perturbation
in the embedding space and project the perturbation vector in the
input space through techniques like nearest neighbour search. In
general, gradient based methods are restricted to differentiable
models and require information about the model’s architecture.
To address the shortcomings of gradient based methods, we pro-
pose a different approach that uses Differential Evolution (DE) [10],
a stochastic evolutionary algorithm. It can be applied to a variety
of optimization problems including non-differentiable and multi-
modal objective functions. DE is a population-based optimization
method which works as follows: Let’s say we want to optimize over
l parameters. Given the population sizem, it randomly initializes
m candidate solutions Xt = (x1, x2, ..., xm ), each of length l . From
these parent solutions it generates candidate children solutions
using the following mutation criteria:
xa,t+1 = xb,t + F (xc,t − xd,t ) (4)
Here, a,b, c and d are randomly chosen distinct indices in the
population, and F is a mutation factor in [0, 2]. Next, these children
are compared against their parents using a fitness function and
m candidates are selected that have the highest fitness (i.e., mini-
mizes the fitness function). This process is repeated until either it
converges or reaches the maximum number of iterations.
Given a query-document pair (q, d) and a trained ranker F we
use DE to find a perturbation vector n that changes the document’s
rank without significantly modifying it. In particular, we need to
find what terms to perturb in the document and the magnitude of
each perturbation. Hence, we represent the solution (perturbation
vector) as a sequence of tuples (i,v) where i ∈ [0, |d|] represents an
index of the term to perturb andv represents the perturbation value.
The length of the solution vector is set to c (the sparsity parameter).
We use the objective function proposed earlier as a fitness function
for DE and run the algorithm for a fixed number of iterations. Based
on the choice of the fitness function, we propose three variants of
the attack,A1 (Equation 1),A2 (Equation 2) andA3 (Equation 3). The
final solution vector is used to construct the perturbed document
d ′. A similar approach has been used to perturb images in order to
fool a classifier [11].
One word at a time: adversarial attacks on retrieval models Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
Dataset Model S@k A0 A1 A2 A3
WikiQA
DRMM 1 0.62 1.0 0.93 1.05 0.01 0.26 0 0.15
Duet 1 0.58 1.0 0.65 1.05 0.02 0.27 0 0.25
KNRM 1 0.56 1.0 0.41 1.05 0 0.13 0.01 0.13
MSMarco
DRMM 1 0.67 1.0 0.73 1.05 0 0.11 0.003 0.04
Duet 1 0.5 1.0 0.57 1.05 0 0.87 0.03 0.81
KNRM 1 0.58 1.0 0.89 1.05 0.01 0.89 0.45 0.89
Table 2: Attackers’ success on changing document’s posi-
tion.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we provide details about the datasets, model train-
ing, perturbation and evaluation metrics.
Data:WeuseWikiQA [14] andMSMarco passage ranking dataset [1]
for training ranking models and evaluating attacks on three ranking
models. For WikiQA, we use 2K queries for training and 240 queries
for evaluation. For MSMarco, we use 20K randomly sampled queries
for training and 220 queries for evaluation. For each test query, we
randomly sample 5 positive documents and 45 negative documents
for evaluation.
Model training:We use the following ranking models: DRMM [3],
DUET [6] and KNRM [13]. We use 300 dimensional Glove embed-
dings [4] to represent each token.
Perturbation: In our experiments, we perturb only relevant docu-
ments1 in top 5 results for each query in the test set. We perturb
documents using all three attackers (A1, A2, and A3) and evaluate
ranker performance on the perturbed documents. The number of
iterations and population size are fixed to 100 and 500 respectively.
Evaluation: We explore several metrics for understanding the
effectiveness of perturbations and their impact on ranker perfor-
mance. The goal of an attacker is to fool the ranker into lowering
the position of the document in the list. The success of the attacker
is measured as the percentage of relevant documents whose posi-
tion changed by k when perturbed by the attacker. Let R(d) denote
the rank of a document d and ld denote its relevance. Then, the
attacker’s success at k (S@k) is defined as follows:
S@k =
∑
d ;ld>0 1(R(d ′)−R(d ))>=k∑
d ;ld>0 1
Here, d ′ is a perturbation of d generated by the attacker. We also
measure the number of non-relevant documents crossed (NRC) by
perturbing d to d ′ as defined below:
NRC =
∑
dˆ ;ldˆ=0
1R(d )<R(dˆ )<R(d ′)
We compare the performance of the proposed attacks against a
random baselineA0 where the adversary perturbs a word at random
from the text and replaces it with the most similar word (minimum
cosine distance in the embedding space) from the corpus.
1We found that non-relevant documents can be perturbed easily by adding noisy text.
Model Atk 1 token 3 tokens 5 tokens
DRMM
A1 0.944±2.776 3.867±6.334 6.814±7.858
A2 0.037±0.623 0.304±1.752 0.647±3.129
A3 0.404±1.730 1.280±3.388 2.084±4.496
Duet
A1 8.110±4.252 13.000±4.292 14.637±4.043
A2 0.429±0.896 0.890±1.479 1.670±3.266
A3 7.187±4.284 10.440±4.806 12.055±4.771
KNRM
A1 11.543±6.737 18.560±5.659 21.360±s6.459
A2 6.234±8.125 9.463±9.408 11.211±10.086
A3 11.114±6.611 17.783±5.914 20.291±6.500
Table 3: NRC for MSMarco dataset
Model Atk 1 token 3 tokens 5 tokens
DRMM
A1 2.380±3.252 4.009±4.499 4.403±4.753
A2 0.014±0.118 0.464±1.629 1.098±2.943
A3 1.403±2.127 2.286±3.160 2.455±3.300
Duet
A1 2.175±2.454 3.527±3.585 3.773±3.857
A2 0.040±0.221 0.175±0.506 0.366±0.899
A3 2.005±2.270 3.175±3.277 3.221±3.280
KNRM
A1 1.632±2.064 2.580±2.873 2.849±3.155
A2 0.188±0.577 0.853±1.647 1.160±2.014
A3 1.575±1.990 2.556±2.868 2.830±3.084
Table 4: NRC for WikiQA dataset
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We focus on three research questions to investigate the impact of
adversarial attacks on ranking models.
RQ1:What is the attacker’s success in changing a document’s position
without significantly changing the document? To answer this ques-
tion, we measure an attacker’s success (S@k) when we restrict the
number of perturbed words to one in each document. The results for
k = 1 and k = 5 are given in Table 2. Notice that A0 can change the
rank of almost half of the relevant documents but not beyond five
positions. Both A1 and A3 can change the rank of all the relevant
documents by just changing one term in the document. In case of
MSMarco, they can lower the rank of >81% relevant documents
by more than four positions except for DRMM ranker. Overall, we
found that A1 has the highest success rate among all the attackers
as it has greater flexibility to change the terms.
We report mean and variance of NRC on the test sets in Table 3
and 4 for MSMarco and WikiQA datasets respectively. Increasing
the number of perturbed words increases NRC across all the at-
tackers. On MSMarco dataset, KNRM is the most vulnerable ranker
across all the attackers. On average A1 can push a relevant doc-
ument beyond 11 non-relevant documents by changing only one
token when evaluated against KNRM ranker. On the other hand,
the performance of attackers across all the models is similar on
the WikiQA dataset. Overall, all the attackers perform better on
MSMarco dataset compared to WikiQA. We argue that the larger
length of passages in MSMarco provides more room for perturba-
tions as opposed to the shorter length of answers in WikiQA.
RQ2: What is the similarity between perturbed and original text
when we restrict the number of perturbed words to pl = {1, 3, 5} in
each document? Adversarial perturbations may cause the meaning
of document text to change. Thus, it is important to control this
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(a) DRMM (A1) (b) DUET (A1) (c) KNRM (A1)
(d) DRMM (A3) (e) DUET (A3) (f) KNRM (A3)
Figure 1: NRC vs. cosine sim on MSMarco where blue=1 word, or-
ange=3 words and green=5 words perturbations respectively.
Model Atk WikiQA MSMarco1 token 3 tokens 1 token 3 tokens
DRMM
A1 0.31±0.45 0.43±0.47 0.05±0.14 0.11±0.17
A2 0.005±0.06 0.005±0.37 0.001±0.05 0.01±0.11
A3 0.216±0.40 0.30±0.44 0.02±0.11 0.06±0.15
Duet
A1 0.24±0.41 0.37±0.46 0.59±0.40 0.68±0.35
A2 0.003±0.07 -0.04±0.23 0.02±0.30 0.03±0.46
A3 0.226±0.40 0.35±0.45 0.56±0.40 0.61±0.39
KNRM
A1 0.22±0.41 0.30±0.44 0.53±0.37 0.59±0.34
A2 0.03±0.16 0.09±0.34 0.30±0.42 0.38±0.43
A3 0.218±0.40 0.31±0.44 0.52±0.38 0.59±0.34
Table 5: % drop in P@5 due to perturbed text
change such that perturbed words are semantically similar to origi-
nal text. We measure the semantic similarity between embeddings
of original text and perturbed text using cosine distance as done in
previous work [12]. Figure 1 shows similarity b/w perturbed and
original text when 1, 3 or 5 tokens are changed in MSMarco passage
text for three different models. We only focus on similarity for A1
and A3 attackers due to space limitations.
Overall, the cosine similarity between perturbed and original
text across attackers is relatively high (∼0.97), even though the
document may be pushed below ∼20 non-relevant documents with
only single token perturbations. As expected, perturbing more to-
kens leads to lower similarity. Cosine similarity drops to ∼0.90
across models for 5 word perturbations. Both A1 and A3 attackers
can push documents to relatively lower positions with 1-3 token
perturbations, however, we found that A1 tends to perturb query
tokens in passages to change ranker output. We found that A1
changed query tokens in 65% (DRMM), 11% (Duet) and 2% (KNRM)
documents in MSMarco and 50%, 17% and 3% documents inWikiQA
respectively. However, A3 achieves similar performance in terms
of similarity and rank change without changing any query tokens.
RQ3:What is the ranker performance after adversarial attacks? We
evaluate model robustness against an adversarial attacker with P@5.
We compute perturbed P@5 by replacing the original document’s
(di ) ranker score si with the new score s ′i given by the ranker on the
perturbed input d ′i .
2 So, for every document the attacker perturbs,
its new score replaces the old ranker score and P@5 is recomputed.
We report the % drop in P@5 for both datasets in Table 5. We find
2Note that ranker output for all other documents in the list dj,i remains the same.
that A1 and A3 attackers are able to reduce P@5 significantly, in
some cases as much as ∼20% in WikiQA and ∼50% in MSMarco
by changing one token in the text. Although, A3’s drop in P@5 is
lower than that of A1’s across all datasets since it is penalized for
changing query terms.
We also found %drop in P@5 to be a function of ranker perfor-
mance. Models with higher precision were harder to beat by the
attacker, i.e., were more robust to token changes in document text.
For example, in WikiQA original P@5 (mean,std) for DRMM, Duet
and KNRM was 0.204±0.17, 0.207±0.18 and 0.22±0.20 respectively.
It is interesting to note that all attackers are able to reduce DRMM
P@5 by single token perturbations by highest margin. However,
in MSMarco, DRMM P@5 is the highest amongst all other models,
thus hardest to fool by all attackers. We observe very little drop
in precision for A2 attacker across models in both datasets which
indicates that very strict attackers may not be able to find suitable
candidates to perturb documents. One interesting finding was that
in some cases the attacker replaced document text with query tokens
to lower document score as shown in Table 1.
6 CONCLUSION
Adversarial attacks on classification models both in text and vi-
sion have helped reduce the generalization error of such models.
However, there is limited literature on adversarial attacks on infor-
mation retrieval models. In this work, we explored effectiveness
and quality of three simple methods of attacking black box deep
learning models. The attackers were designed to change document
text such that an information retrieval model is fooled into lowering
the document position. We found that perturbed text generated by
these attackers by changing few tokens is semantically similar to
original text and can fool the ranker to push a relevant document
below ∼2-3 non-relevant documents. Our findings can be further
used to train rankers with adversarial examples to reduce their
generalization error.
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